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Despite much rhetoric about the 'greening business' agenda and various initiatives to promote the va-
luation of ecosystem services and natural capital, the corporate sector has been slow to integrate social
and environmental factors into core business models and to extend this integration across their supply
chain. Our effort to narrow this thematic and methodological gap focuses on the co-beneﬁts and positive
externalities that can be generated through progressive knowledge exchange between a corporation and
its suppliers. Using a case study of contract farming of malting barley in water scarce Rajasthan (India),
we examine the extent to which best practice agronomic advice given by corporate farm extension
workers can help small scale farmers (suppliers) to increase income, improve resource efﬁciency (water,
fertiliser, energy) and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Findings from our desk study suggest positive
results for all these variables, when compared to the regional benchmark of non-participating farmers.
Under a scenario where advice is provided on all major crops (not just barley), we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
further increase of farm income. Our valuation of the reduced exploitation of ground water (alone) ex-
ceeds the advisors' annual salaries, suggesting that under full social and environmental accounting, the
extension services are not a cost factor, but a proﬁt making unit of the company. We discuss of our
ﬁndings in relation to alternative approaches to PES and alternative investment strategies in green
technologies.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
There is a growing effort to involve businesses in the protection of
the natural environment and the world's ecosystems, from grand
declarations (e.g. the UN ‘Natural Capital Declaration'-Mulder et al.,
2013) to more practical reports focusing on the quantiﬁcation and
valuation of externalities produced by businesses and the ecosystem
services which underpin business performance (World Business
Council for Sustainable Development, 2011; TRUCOST and TEEB for
Business Coalition, 2013). A company creates externalities when it
undertakes activities that bring costs or beneﬁts to unsuspecting
third parties. Environmental externalities often relate to impacts on
public goods such as clean air or fresh water resources.
Businesses wishing to account for, manage and plan their en-
vironmental and social impacts can face a number of challenges,
from the lack of established assessment methods to problemsB.V. This is an open access articlealong the supply chain where they can exert only partial inﬂuence
on the behaviour of their suppliers and customers. The nature of
relationships along the supply chain has been a focus of media,
advocacy and academic attention, showing how a company's
brand value can be damaged by revelations about the poor prac-
tices of their suppliers (e.g. child labour, environmental pollution,
(see Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi, 2010) but also how good en-
vironmental and social practices can be promoted amongst sup-
pliers through a pro-active and supportive approach by the larger
company that buys their products (e.g. Walton et al., 1998). This
paper examines a particular kind of supply chain relationship;
between a large company and the many individual farmers sup-
plying its feedstock. Amongst supply chain relations, this parti-
cular relationship stands out for the size differential, i.e. a one big
buyer with thousands of small suppliers. It also stands out for the
fact that farms are not simply businesses; they are families and
communities, rooted in a particular agro-ecological landscape and
rural culture. The size differential means that companies can have
huge leverage on farmers, dictating contracting arrangements that
shape farming strategies and thus impact on the rural landscape
and the ecosystem services it provides. This leverage may increaseunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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to have less access to capital, to agronomic advice and (due to poor
infrastructure) to different markets and alternative buyers (e.g.
Galt, 2007; Porter and Philips-Howard, 1997). Some critical au-
thors have argued that these contract farming arrangements are
exposing farmers to new risks, or are causing an unequal dis-
tribution of risks and the subordination of farmers (e.g. GoldSmith,
1985; Watts, 1990; Clapp, 1994).
A more progressive outlook would suggest that it is in the long-
term interest of the company to think more holistically about their
relationship with the farmers. For example gaining farmer loyalty
can help to ensure security of supply for their regional processing
plants despite the arrival of new buyers on the local market; the
provision of training and the supply of farming materials can help
to ensure high quality feedstock despite disease outbreaks or ad-
verse weather conditions. Porter and Kramer (2011) ﬂag up several
recent examples of corporations beneﬁtting by working more
closely and more synergistically with farmers and farmer com-
munities; their call for ‘creating shared value' could be read as a
call for creating positive local externalities through company ac-
tivities that go beyond short-term gain or a singular focus on the
short-term bottom line deﬁned exclusively through traditional ﬁ-
nancial accounting tools. Known as a leading thinker on business
strategy, Michael Porter's ideas are evidently having some inﬂu-
ence within the business community (for examples in the agri-
cultural sector, see FSG, 2011; Nestle, 2013). The idea of creating
shared value differs from corporate social responsibility in that it
seeks to anchor pro-social and pro-environmental corporate be-
haviour within markets and value propositions, rather than within
an ‘add-on' narrative of corporate duties and responsibilities.
Porter and Kramer list three broad areas where companies should
seek to create shared values; (1) rethink products and markets to
provide more appropriate services and reach those (poor people)
with unmet needs; (2) mitigate risks and improve productivity in
the value chain and (3) enable local cluster development, e.g. by
supporting suppliers. It is clear that the last two areas can be of
direct relevance for contract farming. Also the ﬁrst area can be
relevant for contract farming, in at least two respects. First of all, in
developing countries many farmers have unmet information
needs, i.e. they require more, better and faster information on
technologies, crops, markets, pests or weather in order to make
good agronomic and farm management decisions. Secondly, the
company's extension workers and logistical operations (e.g. they
have empty trucks driving into the countryside to pick up the
feedstock) could be seen not just as costs, but as (underutilised)
assets that could be deployed for additional business activities,
such as the delivery of new and socially beneﬁcial goods and
services to remote rural areas1.
The existing literature on shared value and on the mutual bene-
ﬁts of contract farming is limited in size and is mainly qualitative
(Galt, 2007; Porter and Philips-Howard, 1997; Birthal et al., 2008;
Porter and Kramer, 2011; Fayet and Vermeulen, 2012; Baumüller
et al., 2014; Christiansen, 2014). There is a gap in the literature about
the extent to which companies can work progressively with farmers,
to reduce the negative environmental externalities of existing
farming practices and share the economic beneﬁts of a long term,
stable and beneﬁcial interdependence along the supply chain.
In a contribution to narrowing this gap, this paper aims to as-
sess, quantify and value the farming related externalities caused by
a company's extension services, using a case study from Rajasthan
where small scale farmers were incentivised to start growing1 For example Dunavant Cotton use their normal logistical operations to supply
mosquito nets in rural Zambia, see http://nwkzambia.com/index.php/mosquito-
nets/malting barley for a company's regional processing plant. It is a
case of crop switching on existing agricultural land.
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we
provide the business and biophysical context for our case study.
We explain the data sources we used and the externalities we have
chosen to examine. We develop a set of scenarios which allow us
to examine the relative environmental performance of the farmers
who grow barley for the company. In the third section we quantify
the externalities associated with each scenario. In section four we
convert these to monetary values. In section ﬁve we discuss the
limitations and consequences of our ﬁndings, exploring different
intervention options to further improve resource efﬁciency or
farmers' incomes. Section six contains our conclusions.2. Case study background
2.1. Business context
Barley has traditionally been grown in Rajasthan and more
widely in northern India as a fodder and feed crop with low input
requirements. However over the last 40 years, farmers have shif-
ted from barley towards (higher value) wheat or mustard pro-
duction (Verma et al., 2010). In 2006 the multinational SABMiller
set up the Saanjhi Unnati (Progress through Partnership) project in
Rajasthan to develop a local supply chain for barley for their new
regional brewery, which would reduce their need to import
malting barley from abroad. The company employs 30 agricultural
extension workers across Rajasthan who liaise with farmers and
sensitize them to the adoption of barley varieties that are more
suitable to brewing (notably variety K551, brought in from Uttar
Pradesh). Participating farmers receive best practice advice (water
management, fertilizer application) to reduce inputs and improve
yield. Data was collected by an Indian consultant who was hired by
the company to undertake focus group discussions with the ex-
tension workers. We obtained the above details and data from
discussions with the company, facilitated by the Cambridge In-
stitute for Sustainability Leadership2.
2.2. Biophysical system
The major crops grown in the Rajasthan region include barley
(Hordeum vulgare L.), wheat (Triticum aestivum), mustard (Brassica
juncea) and gram (Cicer arientinum) grown in the Rabi (winter,
dry) season and soybean (Glycine max), guar gum (Cyamopsis tet-
ragonoloba), bajra millet (Pennisetum glaucum) and groundnut
(Arachis hypogaea) during the Kharif (summer, rainy) season.
This study focuses on the Rabi system and the inputs and
outputs produced from this system (table 1); the corresponding
ecosystem services and natural capital externalities (table 2). We
did not have sufﬁcient data to assess impacts on cultural ecosys-
tem services or on biodiversity. Since this is a case study of crop
change on existing ﬁelds in an intensely farmed landscape, we
anticipate these impacts to be relatively minor. As the study
sought to achieve quantiﬁcation within a business context we
focused on externalities where data on inputs and methods to
calculate impact/outputs were readily available (Tables 1 and 2), as
follows: Water is pumped from wells using diesel and electric
pumps, resulting in decline in groundwater reserves and CO2
production. Inorganic fertilisers (DAP, urea) and organic fertiliser
added to the soil result in denitriﬁcation of nitrates to N2O an2 This was funded by the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), under
the ‘Valuing Nature Network’ http://www.valuing-nature.net. Apart from the use of
data that came from company employees, our study is entirely independent.
Table 1 Fertiliser, fuel and water inputs and associated outputs that were assessed in this study.
Inputs to the system Output
Atmospheric Water
Urea CO(NH2)2 Green house gas emissions CO2þDenitriﬁcation of
nitrogen to N2O
NO3 – release of nitrates through runoff and leaching to local water
bodies resulting in Eutrophication
DAP (Diammonuim phosphaste)
(NH4)2HPO4
Green house gas emissions N2O NO3þP2O5 nitrate and phosphates resulting in eutrophication
Organic matter (Animal manure and crops
residues)
Green house gas emissions N2O NO3þP2O5 nitrate and phosphates resulting in eutrophication
Fossil fuels (ground water pumps) Green house gas emissions CO2
Ground water (blue water) Reduction in water availability and quality.
Runoff and leaching resulting in eutrophication
Rain water (green water) Runoff and leaching resulting in eutrophication
C. Bowe, D.v. der Horst / Ecosystem Services 15 (2015) 1–10 3important GHG. Rainfall and irrigation can lead to runoff and
leaching of nitrate and phosphate from fertiliser additions leading
to eutrophication of local water bodies and a reduction in water
quality. This led to carbon balance (green house gases) and water
balance (green, blue and grey water) being included (Tables 1 and
2). The addition of crop residues and organic manure leads to an
increase in the amount of carbon stored in the soil, while tillage
leads to the violation of carbon and release of CO2. However under
the methods applied we found no difference between crops for
these externalities. Other outputs such as volatilisation of ammo-
nia and nitric oxide from denitriﬁcation were not considered in
this study for reasons stated above.
Groundwater extraction by farmers signiﬁcantly exceeds nat-
ural recharge and the current agricultural system is clearly not
sustainable in the long term. It is anticipated that the continued
depletion of groundwater resources will eventually result in the
abandonment of dry season farming ('Rabi' crops are completely
dependent on irrigation) and the reduction of yields in the rainy
season ('Kharif' crops; currently partially dependent on irrigation).
2.3. Scenario approach and baseline selection
The study was implemented on a model farm in the district of
Jiapur, Rajasthan, based on an average farm size of 2.8 ha. An as-
sumption is made that 100% of the production area for each crop is
irrigated during the Rabi season. While the choice of Rabi crops
can inﬂuence the choice of Kharif crops, externalities from the
Kharif crops are not considered within the study as the company
has less inﬂuence over this.
We used a scenario approach to estimate change in externalities,
taking account of changes in cropping area, crop yield, fertiliser ap-
plication and ground water levels based on general changes in the
agriculture sector and the impact of the company. Four scenarios
were developed, a historical pre-company scenario (1) predating the
company's establishment in the area (2005–2006) and three present
time scenarios (2012–2013). The present time baseline scenario
(2) represents farmers NOT working with the company and two
present time company scenario representing farmers who draw on
the company's extension programme to adopt agronomic best
practice with regards to malting barley only (3a), or with regards to
malting barley as well as their other their other main crops (3b)
(Table 3).
2.3.1. Proportion of cropping area and yield
Ministry of Agriculture, Govt. of India district level data was used
derive the proportion of cropping area (based on production area
data) and yield for the historical and baseline scenarios. SABMiller
works with 6000 farmers in Rajasthan, half of them in Jaipur district.
Jaipur has a population of over 6.5 million, so it is assumed that the
company's activities impact such a small proportion of farmers as tohave a negligible effect on the Ministry of Agriculture Jaipur data.
This data show year to year variation. To identify general trends in
this data a regression model was run to model a line of best ﬁt. The
pre-company scenario and no company scenario (baseline) produc-
tion and yield values were read off this line for the 2005–2006 and
2012–2013 growing seasons respectively.
For the company scenarios (Scenarios 3a and b) values for the
yield (see exceptions below) and proportion of cropping area for each
were derived from the SABMiller extension worker focus groups. The
conservative company scenario 3a assumes that the effects of the
extension workers only inﬂuence barley yield and not that of the
other crops. Therefore the baseline scenario yield values are used
again for this scenario for all crops except Barley. While 3b assumes
that the SABMiller extension service has an impact on all Rabi crops in
the system due to improved management techniques and access to
information. The distinction is made between the scenarios (3a and b)
as it is assumed that as the farm extensionworkers whowork directly
with the farmers on the production and sale of barley will have a
greater knowledge of Barley over the other crops (Table 3).
Based on comparisons between the yield data expressed by the
focus group studies and the Ministry of Agriculture district level
data, differences in yield were found between the baseline and the
company scenarios. While these differences are substantial, they
are within the 45–70% yield gaps for major crops identiﬁed by
Mueller et al. (2012).
2.3.2. Fertiliser application
The drive for agricultural intensiﬁcation and fertiliser subsidies
has led to an increase in fertiliser applications across India (Shar-
ma, 2012). Rajasthan showed a 26.2% increase in fertiliser use in
kg/ha between 2000–2010 (Sharma and Thaker, 2011). Based on
this we assume a 13% fertiliser increase between the historical and
present time scenarios (Table 3).
Farm extension workers identiﬁed agronomic management
changes adopted by participating farmers. UREA usage for barley
was reduced from 110 kg/ha to 90 kg/ha (Table 3). The extension
ofﬁcers noted that urea added height to the barley plants. These
taller plants were more prone to lodging under excess irrigation or
rainfall leading to losses and yield reductions.
2.3.3. Ground water levels
Based on data on ground water levels in Jaipur and rate of decline
(CGWB, 2007), a ground water depth of 30 m is assumed for the
historical and 40 m for the baseline and company scenarios (Table 3).
2.3.4. Barley price
For barley, the company provides farmers a 5% price premium
above the market rate. This is incorporated into the scenarios
(Table 3).
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Net farm income was also estimated for all scenarios. Crop and
fodder prices, crop/fodder ratios and cost of production were derived
from farm gate prices reported by farm extension worker focus
groups (Table A2). Due to the high temporal variability in fodder
prices seen in the region likely due to availability of fodder and the
localised nature of markets, we also considered data from data from
Directorate of Marketing and Inspection (DMI), Ministry of Agri-
culture, Government of India3. Due to the high variability very con-
servative values were selected. Values up to 10 times greater have
been recorded. DAP and Urea costs were adjusted to account for
changes in applications in the various scenarios. Extension worker
advise led to a reduction in seed rate for barley from 60 kg per acre
to 45-55 kg per acre. The effect of this was a small reduction in the
cost of production for barley in company scenarios.3. Quantiﬁcation of externalities4
3.1. Greenhouse gasses
IPCC guidelines (de Klein et al., 2006) provided standard con-
version factors for determining nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions based
on mineral fertiliser, organic amendments, crop residues and mi-
neralisation for all crops. The amount of synthetic fertilisers (Urea
and DAP) and farm yard manure (FYM) applied per hectare of land
was provided from the farm extension worker focus groups. The
amount of nitrogen applied per hectare was based on its proportion
based on molecular weight (Urea 46% (CO(NH2)2/DAP 18%
(NH4)2HPO4). This was then multiplied by the conversion factor from
de Klein et al. (2006) to estimate level of N2O emitted (Table 1).
In order to derive the amount of CO2 produced from pumping
up ground water, it was necessary to identify the amount of water
applied to the crops, the depth from which it is extracted (see
Section 3.2) and the power source for pumping. Values on con-
sumptive water use (CWU) of blue water for each crop were cal-
culated based on Hoekstra et al. (2011) using the CROPWAT
modelling software (FAO, 2009) (see Section 3.2). All pumps are
assumed to be electric. Nelson et al. (2009) estimated that carbon
emissions to lift a 1000 m3 of water 1 m to be 3.873 kg C with
electric pumps (assuming electricity grid transmission losses (5%)
and efﬁciency of electrical and diesel pumps (30%)) (Nelson et al.,
2009). The Global warming potential (GWP) index was used to
convert all GHG emissions to CO2e (Lv et al., 2010).
3.2. Water
For crop plants, the water foot print or virtual water is mainly
determined by evapotranspiration occurring during the timespan
between sowing and harvest. While the water applied through
rainfall and irrigation may be greater than that evaporated, the water
that has percolated into the soil or lost as runoff is not classiﬁed as
utilised or consumed water, because it will be re-added to the sys-
tem as groundwater (Schubert, 2011). Water use from effective
rainfall (green water) (CWU Effective rain) and from irrigation (blue
water) (CWU Irrigation) were estimated based broadly on the Water
Footprint Network Standard methods in Hoekstra et al. (2011) using
the CROPWAT 8modelling tool (FAO, 2009). Crop coefﬁcient (Kc) and
Length of Growth Period (LGP) values were selected from the sci-
entiﬁc literature based on studies conducted in India, in the same
agro climatic conditions and varieties mentioned in the extension3 Available at http://agmarknet.nic.in/
4 Finer details of the quantiﬁcation of externalities are described in an internal
report available from the lead author.
Table 3
Agricultural scenarios for Jaipur.
Scenario Proportion of crop area (%) Yield change from Baseline (%) Barley price
change (%)
Inorganic fertiliser ap-
plication change (%)
Ground water
level change
Barley Wheat Gram Mustard Barley Wheat Gram Mustard
Scenario 1 (2005– 2006) His-
torical-Precompany
14 41 15 30 15 19 22 22 Current –13% –10 m
Scenario 2 (2012–2013) base-
line No company
15 36 14 35 0 0 0 0 Current 0 0
Scenario 3a (2012–2013) Com-
pany (conservative)
35 30 10 25 þ55 0 0 0 Currentþ5 0 0
(Barley Only 18%
reduction in Urea)
Scenario 3b (2012–2013)Com-
pany (non conservative)
35 30 10 25 þ55 þ24 þ11 þ66 Currentþ5 0 0
(Barley Only 18%
reduction in Urea)
C. Bowe, D.v. der Horst / Ecosystem Services 15 (2015) 1–10 5worker survey data as grown in the region (For all study crops no
lysismeter studies or local Kc values were identiﬁed for Jaipur or
even in Rajasthan). Due to the relatively subjective nature of this
approach a sensitivity analysis was also conducted using values of Kc
and LGP based on a search of the wider literature both in and outside
India but in similar agro-climatic zones. Mean and Median values for
ETBlue and ETGreen from the sensitivity analysis were found to be
close those derived from the selected Kc and LGP (see Bowe et al.,
2013 for further details). Values for each crop necessary to calculate
the ‘irrigation schedule option' (rooting depth, critical depletion
fraction and yield response) were derived from appropriate crop ﬁles
provided with the software (FAO, 2009) or the literature. The
CROPWAT soil ﬁle was created based on the dominant soil type
classiﬁcation for the Jaipur district Eutric Cambisol derived from the
World Harmonised Soil Database (FAO/IIASA/ISRIC/ISSCAS/JRC,
2012).
To allow green water to be incorporated into the valuation (Sec-
tion 4) we attempted to account for the effect of rainfall on
groundwater recharge. To do this an adjusted CWUblue was esti-
mated referred to as “Ground Water Loss”. The amount of “rain re-
charge” was estimated by combining the green water not used and
“Total Rain Loss” calculated by CROPWAT. The green water not used
is estimated by subtracting the CWUgreen for each crop from the
maximum CWUgreen for all crops in the study (in this case mus-
tard). This adjusted CWUBlue or “Ground Water Loss” is calculated
by subtracting the “rain recharge” from the blue water (CWUBlue)5
To estimate the impacts of water pollution from fertiliser ap-
plication the concept of grey water is used. The methods used here
broadly follow the guidelines for grey water foot printing de-
scribed in Hoekstra et al. (2011). The nutrient loss rate or pollutant
load is the fraction of the total amount of chemicals applied that
reaches the groundwater or surface water. The amount of syn-
thetic fertilisers (Urea and DAP) and farm yard manure (FYM)
applied per hectare of land was provided from the farm extension
worker focus groups. In this case we assume a ﬁxed fraction of the
applied chemicals ﬁnally reach the ground- or surface water
(Hoekstra et al., 2011) 10% of applied nitrogen for nitrate and 1%
for phosphate. Grey water consumption is quantiﬁed based on the
dilution water volumes required to dilute waste ﬂows to such
extent that the quality of the water remains below agreed water
quality standards (Chapagain et al., 2006; Mekonnen and Hoek-
stra, 2010). In this case EU standards were selected for both Ni-
trates (50 mg/l) and Phosphorous (1 mg/l) (Liu et al., 2012).5 The ﬁner details of the estimation of water use and sensitivity analysis are
described in an internal report, available from the lead author.3.3. Scenario outputs
Comparison of the baseline scenario (scenario 2) to the company
scenarios (scenarios 3a and 3b) (Table 5); show a reduction in ex-
ternalities as well as an increase in farm income due to effect of the
extension services (Table 4). In comparison to farmers not exposed to
SABMiller's extension workers, farmers working with the company
have a greater proportion of cropping area under barley and a cor-
responding smaller proportion under the other crops (wheat (6%),
mustard (10%) and gram (4%) less than the baseline scenario-Table 3)
along with a reduction in fertiliser application to Barley. This differ-
ence is likely due to the availability of high quality barley seeds and
extension advice. This has led to a 4% reduction in blue water use
(ground water loss), brought about by the greater proportion of
cropping area used for barley production, which has the lowest blue
water requirements. A 3% reduction is seen in GHG emissions (CO2e),
brought about by the lower energy requirement to pump ground
water and the lower nutrient requirements of barley in comparison
to wheat and gram. This is also inﬂuenced by the change in agro-
nomic management brought about by the company to reduce the
amount of UREA applied to Barley. Grey water is also reduced by 1.4%
due to the shift from wheat and gram and the decline in fertiliser
application to barley. The smaller reduction in the grey water ex-
ternality in comparison to the other externalities is due to mustard
having a slightly lower nitrogen input than barley across the 3 ferti-
liser types. The increase in farm income seen in the company sce-
narios has been brought about by the increase in yield due to im-
proved varieties and management practices, good crop and fodder
price for barley and the SABMiller premium. The higher income in
the non-conservative (3b) scenario is seen due to the assumption
that all crop yield are improved due to best agronomic advise by
extension workers.
It should be highlighted that the baseline (scenario 2) is subject
to the same economic and environmental effect as the company
scenario; this provides a robust counterfactual to the impacts of
the extension services.
The historical scenario was included to look at the general
trends occurring within the agricultural system in Jaipur. Com-
parison between the historical scenario (scenario 1) and the
baseline (scenario 2) indicates a shift from wheat to mustard (and
a very small shift to Barley) in the period 2006–2012. This reﬂects
the aggregate behaviour of all farmers in Jaipur, in the absence of
the company. As a consequence of this trend, there in a small
decline in blue water (ground water loss) (1%) externalities but an
increase in GHG (CO2e) production (24%) and grey water (5%)
likely due to the changes in cropping area and the increase in
fertiliser use brought about by fertiliser subsidies and intensiﬁca-
tion. Farm income has increased. The small reduction in blue water
use could indicate that farmers are concerned about water use and
are moving towards crops that require less irrigation, although
Table 4
Results of the scenarios (per 2.8 ha farm).
Scenarios Crop CO2e CWUBlue CWUGreen Ground water
loss
GWUGrey Income Incomeþfodder Cost of
production
Net farm in-
come (Rs)
Kg yr1 m3 yr1 Rs farm year1
Scenario 1 (historical) Barley 1076 1658 98 1615 671 12,842 14,065 12,851 1214
Wheat 3989 6681 344 6613 2074 41,144 45,002 37,719 7283
Mustard 2507 4116 277 4116 1367 24,948 25,250 15,191 9757
Gram 1226 1999 134 1991 679 16,254 16,254 7595 8659
Total 8798 14,455 854 14,334 4791 95,188 100,571 73,355 26,913
Scenario 2 (Current-Baseline) Barley 1423 1777 105 1730 752 15,347 16,808 13,817 2991
Wheat 4375 5867 302 5806 1895 42,578 46,570 33,627 12,943
Mustard 3631 4802 323 4802 1643 35,574 36,005 18,169 17,405
Gram 1456 1866 125 1858 721 18,542 18,542 7268 11,274
Total 10,885 14,311 856 14,197 5010 112,040 117,925 72,881 44,613
Scenario 3a (Current-Company–
barley advice only)
Barley 3275 4145 245 4038 1674 58,433 63,725 31,478 32,247
Wheat 3646 4889 252 4838 1579 35,482 38,808 28,022 10,786
Mustard 2594 3430 231 3430 1173 25,410 25,718 12,978 12,432
Gram 1040 1333 90 1327 515 13,244 13,244 5191 8053
Total 10,555 13,797 818 13,633 4941 132,568 141,495 77,669 63,517
Scenario 3b (Current-Company–
advice for all crops)
Barley 3275 4145 245 4038 1674 58,433 63,725 31,478 32,247
Wheat 3646 4889 252 4838 1579 43,008 47,040 28,022 19,018
Mustard 2594 3430 231 3430 1173 39,270 39,746 12,978 26,292
Gram 1040 1333 90 1327 515 14,448 14,448 5191 9257
Total 10,555 13,797 818 13,633 4941 155,159 164,959 77,669 86,813
Table 6
Comparison of company trends to historic trends.
Scenario trends Change in Increase in CO2e
output %
Reduction in groundwater loss (use)
%
Increase in grey water
%
Increase in farm income
%
Company trend (3a) compared to historic
trend (1)
16% 409 31 107
Company trend (3b) compared to historic
trend (1)
16% 409 31 238
Table 5
Differences between the scenarios in absolute and relative terms.
Differences between scenarios* CO2e output (kg/y/
farm)
Groundwater loss (use) (m3/y/farm) Grey water (m3/y/farm) Farm income (Rs/y/
farm)*
Historic (1) to current baseline (2) þ2087 138 þ220 þ17700
þ23.72% 0.96% þ4.57% þ65.77%
Current baseline (2) to company (3a; barley advice
only)
330 563 69 þ18905
3.03% 3.97% 1.38% þ42.37%
Current baseline (2) to company (3b; advice for all
crops)
330 563 69 þ42200
3.03% 3.97% 1.38% þ94.59%
* Only for farm income 'þ ' indicates an improvement.
C. Bowe, D.v. der Horst / Ecosystem Services 15 (2015) 1–106they may also be driven by the high value of mustard in com-
parison to wheat.
The development of the historical scenario allows changes in
externalities to be assessed relative to the historic trend for non-
participating farmers (Table 6). This indicated that in the period
2006–2013 GHG emissions (CO2e) and grey water emissions have
increased, but these increases are a lower under the company
scenario; 16% (GHG emissions) and 31% (grey water) less than
what would have happened in the absence of the company. Over
this time, there has been a reduction in water use (ground water
loss) by farmers, but under the company scenario, that reduction is
much bigger (409%) than what would have happened in theabsence of the company. There has also been an increase in farm
income, but under the company scenarios, that increase has been
much higher; 107% (3a) and 238% (3b) higher than would have
happened in the absence of the company.4. Valuation of externalities
4.1. Types of externalities
In valuing the externalities of these different scenarios, we fo-
cus mainly on ground water loss, which takes account of blue and
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mentioned by Rubio and Casino (2001); increased pumping costs
and the loss of shallow wells that have dried up. It would also have
been possible (as it has been observed elsewhere; see (Reddy,
2005)) to see some reduced agricultural production due to lower
groundwater levels, however the reduction in water use is be-
tween historic and current scenario is too small to allow us to
assume that there has actually been an actual reduction in the area
that is under irrigation or yield levels. Hence this is not considered.
4.2. Pumping cost externality
The average farm growing barley for SABMiller is using a total
of 13,797 m3/y of water in irrigation (Table 4). Lifting 1 m3 of water
by 1 m requires 9.53410–3 kWh (assuming a pumping efﬁciency
of 30% and grid losses of 5%; see Nelson et al., 2009), so a drop of
1m of the groundwater table, would require 131.540 kWh extra
electricity for pumping up this water. In 2013, domestic consumers
were charged a maximum of 5.45 rupees/0.0908$ per kWh in
Rajasthan6 so that 131.540 kWh¼$11.94. This annual cost is in-
creasing year on year as the water table drops further. Data from
the Rajasthan Groundwater Department (CGWB, 2007) show that
groundwater levels are declining across Jaipur. The worst affected
agricultural blocks have experienced a drop of 0.7 m/y in the
period 1984–2006, 1.4 m/y in the period 2001–2006. In other
words groundwater depletion is not just systemic; it is actually
accelerating over time. If we assume that groundwater has to be
pumped up from 40 m below the surface, then the total electricity
costs of pumping amount to $477.6/year/farm, or $0.0346/m3.
However, electricity prices are subsidised in India By assuming
that consumer prices are only 75% (IISD, 2012, p. 13) of the real
cost of production, we arrive at a real cost of $ 0.0433/m3 of water
pumped to the surface.
4.3. Dried wells externality
If x wells are lost in the region as the groundwater level drops
by y meter, then the lost well externality can be calculated as:
((P*x)/F)/y per farm, per m of reduced ground water level,
Where P is the price of a well and F is the number of farms in
the region. Since we want to know the lost well externality value
of a unit of groundwater that is pumped up, we need to multiply
this equation by the annual groundwater level drop (G) and then
divide by the amount of water that is over-extracted every year.
The latter can be calculated as the average irrigation water use per
farm per year (I), divided by the aquifer exploitation rate (R):
[((P*x)/F)/y] *G/(I/R)
For Jaipur we used the following values (CGWB, 2007 unless
stated otherwise):
P¼$1500 (based on costs reported in Reddy, 2005)
x¼9463 (these are all the low yield wells in Jaipur–CGWB did
not report well depth)
F¼316041 (80% of the district is arable7, which we divided by a
farm size of 2.8 ha)
y¼10 (we assume that the x wells have all fallen dry over the
course of a 10 m groundwater level drop)
G¼2.2 m/y (the worst case ﬁgures in 2004, we assumed them
to be common now)
I¼14455 m3/y (from the cropwat model)
R¼2 (i.e. 200%-we took an upward ﬁgure from the 2004 ex-
ploitation rate of 186%)6 Price obtained at http://www.bijlibachao.com/Calculators/online-electricity-
bill-calculator-for-all-states-in-india.html
7 http://agricoop.nic.in/Agriculture%20contingency%20Plan/Rajasthan/RAJ1-
Jaipur%203.2.2011.pdfThis gives us a marginal dry well externality of $0.00138/m3
based on shallow wells that we assume have largely fallen dry
already. This is small amount masks a very uneven distribution:
farmers who have no shallow wells lose nothing whilst those who
do have such a shallow well, have lost $1500. These are also the
farmers who are least likely to be extracting lots of water.
The value of the marginal dry well externality is 31 smaller
than that of the marginal pumping cost externality. Together, the two
water over-extraction externalities amount to $0.0447/m3 (i.e.
4.5 dollar cent).
4.4. Aggregating the externality values across the whole extension
programme
On an annual basis, a farmer growing malting barley uses
563 m3 water less than the baseline (the non participating farm-
ers). Hence a single company contracted farm avoids water ex-
traction externalities worth $25.38/y. Over the 6000 farms in-
volved in the program this creates a reduction of water use of
3,414,000 m3/y (3.4 km3), which amounts to a total of avoided
water extraction externalities of $152,280/year. With 30 farm ad-
visors employed by the company, and an annual salary per farm
advisor estimated to be $5000/y, the value of the avoid water
extraction externalities exceeds their annual salary. 8
The programwide reduction of CO2 emissions can be calculated
as 6000330 kg/y¼1980 tCO2/y. There are some very wide ran-
ging views on the ‘right' price for carbon (for a literature review,
see Tol, 2010). The faltering EU Emissions Trading Scheme has seen
carbon trade slumping from a high of 35 to 5 Euro/tonne in recent
years, whereas Sweden has wielded a carbon tax in excess of $100/
tonne for some sectors of its economy. In short, it is not possible to
pick a ‘robust' price for carbon. However, just for the sake of
comparison, we could ask at what price would carbon be a com-
parable externality to water for our case study? A carbon price of
$75/tCO2 would put the total carbon emissions reduction at $150 k
and the combined water and carbon savings at $300 k for the 6000
farms participating in the barley growing programme. A price of
$75/tCO2 is quite high, but not extreme (for higher values see
Stern, 2007 and DECC, 2009).5. Discussion
In this study we have identiﬁed, quantiﬁed and valued positive
externalities that could be produced when corporate farm exten-
sion workers provide farmers with best practice agronomic advice.
For all its limitations as a desk-study, we would argue that our
analysis is clearly novel and insightful, in a number of respects.
First of all it illustrates that explorative studies can be carried out
with limited resources, i.e. we were able to draw on existing sec-
ondary data from various on-line sources and bottom-up informa-
tion that is in principle already available within the company, namely
the knowledge and experience of extension workers who spend
much of their time in the ﬁeld with farmers. Independent veriﬁca-
tion through interviews with (participating and non-participating)
farmers is an important limitation of the current study, and a pointer
for future research. We also recognise that other case studies may
have to address more externalities and a greater range of ecosystem
services, especially if the landscape is more diverse in habitats and
gradients, and if the company's intervention results in the extension8 We don’t know what SABMiller pay their staff, but the usual salaries of farm
advisors (graduates in agriculture) in Rajasthan working for NGOs and Indian
companies, are in the region of $2000–$5000 per annum, dependent on experience
and excluding travel allowance (information provided by job adverts and veriﬁed
by mr Meghwanshi, a Rajasthani agricultural expert).
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Our scenarios include not just a counterfactual for a snap-shot
comparison between participating and non-participating farmers,
but (importantly) also a historic comparison, which helps us to
understand the on-going trends within the regional agricultural
system. This reveals that in recent years there has been further
agricultural intensiﬁcation in terms of fertiliser use but not in
terms of water use, which has shown a small reduction. Combined
with the observed crop shifts, this would seem to point towards
water becoming a more constraining factor, despite irrigation
being so widespread and under-priced. Our method to value water
extraction externalities is noteworthy as a pragmatic approach
that illustrates how existing regional water reports and well sur-
veys can be utilised to estimate a generic damage function.
What is perhaps most notable in our ﬁndings, is the signiﬁcant
further improvement in farm proﬁtability which extension workers
can help farmers to achieve, if they go beyond the promotion of best
practice agronomic advice for the feedstock crop for the company
(malting barley) and advise farmers on all their major crops. Our
study opens up a number of interesting questions. Given its potential
to signiﬁcantly increase farmer income, could farmer advice serve as
an alternative to payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes? In
other words, to what extent would be possible to entice farmers with
improved income through targeted agronomic advice, to undertake
more farm management changes that will better safeguard natural
capital or ecosystem services? Secondly, to what extent could a
progressive contract farming scheme be designed in such a way that
part of the increase in farmer income is invested in more sustainable
technologies, thus further reducing the negative impacts of farming
on the environment?
One logical future option would be to provide best practice
agronomic advice on the least thirsty crops, under an agreement that
would see a reduction in the planting of the most thirsty crops or the
uptake of drip-irrigation. This would imply a strategic rethinking of
the role of the farm advisors within the company, which could be
expanded from facilitators of feedstock production for the company,
to the more holistic remit of becoming farm sustainability advisors.
There would be cost implications for the company; expanded
training for the advisors, paying their salaries when they are
spending more time on farms providing advise, monitoring their
effectiveness. However there may also be various alternative options
for funding this, ranging from partnership working with environ-
mental NGOs who may want to support the adoption of sustainable
farming innovations or activities to improve rural livelihoods, or the
ministry of agriculture that is struggling to afford a full farm exten-
sion service and might consider sub-contracting certain activities to
a company that already has employees on the ground and a regional
transport and communication infrastructure in place. Last but not
least, a full accounting of social and environmental externalities by
the company will allow these extra costs to be compared with the
extra beneﬁts that farm advisors produce. Our estimate that the
positive water externalities alone already exceed the farm advisors'
salaries, would suggest that under full social and environmental
accounting, the farm advisory arm of the company can be generating
signiﬁcant positive returns by extending their remit to providing
‘whole farm' sustainability advise (as opposed to single crop advice).
In other words, farm advisors may in the past have been seen as just
a cost factor but our research shows that they can play a key role in
creating shared value.
By implication this paper also throws up questions about the
rationale for investment and supply chain management decisions
by the company. For example, why did they set up a contract
farming operation for locally grown malting barley, rather than
continuing to import good quality malting barley from abroad, or
purchasing barley that is already traded on the Indian market? We
do not have independently veriﬁable information on suchdecisions, which are often hidden behind business conﬁdentiality.
It is easy to identify potential motivations, e.g. local production
may be cheaper, combining local production with purchases on
the open market is a way to reduce the risk of supply chain in-
terruptions or risk of exposure to unfavourable currency exchange
rates (the beer is sold for rupees on the indian market; imported
barley is paid for in foreign currency). Investing in a local supply
chain may be a tool for building political capital, which is useful
when dealing with the various regulators. It may create new
marketing opportunities (e.g. Indian beer made with Indian bar-
ley). In short, there are a number of non-environmental reasons
why the company may have decided to invest in this local supply
chain. The reduction in groundwater use, is likely to be an acci-
dental positive outcome of that business decision.
As a ﬁnal point of discussion, despite positive marginal change
at the farm level it is important to recognise that the unsustainable
depletion of the aquifer is so great that it is very unlikely that it
could be fully resolved by extension services alone (provided by
the state, targeting all farmers, never mind private extension ser-
vices targeting some farmers). A collaborative and coordinated
approach is required across the entire watershed, involving all
signiﬁcant water users, with investments being made not just to
reduce groundwater use but also to increase capture and retention
of rainwater. The tragedy of groundwater commons is widely re-
cognised, but it could be argued that there is much more scope for
corporations to act as facilitators and lead-stakeholders in in-
itiating, formulating and implementing collaborative management
agreements in developing countries. After all, multinational com-
panies are signiﬁcant regional investors with highly visible assets
on the ground and with a wealth of in-house environmental ex-
pertise due to the fact that they also operate in markets where
environmental regulations are more elaborate and stringent.6. Conclusions
As a novel contribution to research on creating shared value,
and the role of corporations in maintaining natural capital and
regional ecosystem services, this paper set out to examine the
extent to which a company depending on regional farmer-pro-
duced feedstock, can help create positive environmental ex-
ternalities in the farming system by providing participating
farmers with best practice agricultural advice through their agri-
cultural extension services.
In a case study which involved a crop change on some of the
farmers' ﬁelds within an existing arable landscape, and we have
focused on two externalities which we believed to be most im-
portant in this case, namely greenhouse gas emissions and
groundwater abstraction for irrigation. The latter is of great im-
portance in the case study area, semi arid Rajasthan, due to the
continued overexploitation of the aquifer. The dropping water
tables affect all farmers, but especially poorer farmers who cannot
afford to drill deeper wells.
Our analysis has shown that farm extension services can help
to produce signiﬁcant environmental beneﬁts and increased
farmer income. Having assessed, quantiﬁed and valued green-
house gas emissions reductions and reductions in ground water
use, we found that under the current company scenario, the value
of these positive externalities is already sufﬁciently large that it
exceeds the costs of running the farming extension service. Al-
though these positive environmental impacts may be accidental
by-products of a commercial decision to diversify supply options,
it should open the door for more progressive thinking within
companies about the role and value of their existing extension
services, and how to make the most of them.
We have discussed a scenario in which farm advisors do not
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buys) but on all the other crops grown by the farmer and sold to
other customers. Under this farmer-optimal scenario, farmers' in-
comes show a signiﬁcant further growth without affecting the
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions and groundwater use al-
ready achieved by the current company scenario.
Further research would be needed to examine how this farmer-Table A1
Baseline scenario values for fertiliser application. All derived from extension worker foc
Crop Barley
Urea application (kg ha1 ) 110
DAP application (kg ha1 ) 100
Organic fertiliser application (kg ha1 ) 22,239
Table A2
Crop yields for all scenarios and fodder crop ratios.
Crop Barley Wheat Mus
Crop yield baseline scenario 2 (tons ha 1) 2.9 3.3 1.1
Crop yield historical scenario 1 (tons ha 1) 2.6 2.8 0.9
Crop yield company scenarios 3a and 3b (tons ha 1) 4.5 3.3 (4) 1.1 (
Fodder/yield ratio 1.5 2 2
Values in parentheses only non-conservative company scenario (3b)
Table A3
Crop and fodder prices and cost of production.
Crop Barley Wheat Mustard Gram Derived from
Crop Price (Rs ton1) 12,600 12,800 33,000 43,000 Extension worker
Fodder price (Rs ton1) 800 600 200 0 Extension worker
Agriculture, Gove
Cost of production (Rs ton1) 32,898 33,360 18,540 29,650 Extension worker
Table A4
Source for Kc values selected and rational.
Crop Source
Barley Sabu et al.
2000
Wheat Tyagi et al.
2000
Mustard Sabu et al.
2000
Gram Sabu et al.
2000
Table A5
Selected Length of growing period and Crop coefﬁcients.
Crop Length of growing periods (days)
Sowing
daten
Initial Development Mid-season Late se
Barley 10/11 15 25 50 30
Wheat 20/11 16 27 54 33
Mustard 15/10 15 45 65 25
Gram 15/10 23 47 52 28
n Sowing date derived from Extension worker focus groups.optimal scenario could be pursued without the risk of a rebound
effect (e.g. farmers using their increased income to buy stronger
pumps) but with farmers reinvesting some of their increased in-
come in green technologies which can further reduce their de-
pendence on, and use of, ground water or fossil fuels. Such re-
search would not be possible without both the farmers' and the
company's active collaboration. As the logical go-between, a strongus groups.
Wheat Mustard Gram
100 50 344
100 100 185
24,711 24,711 2670
tard Gram Derived from
1.1 Ministry of Agriculture, Govt. of India – Jiapur district data
0.9 Ministry of Agriculture, Govt. of India – Jiapur district data
1.7) 1.1 (1.2) Extension worker focus groups
0 Extension worker focus groups
focus groups
focus groups and Directorate of Marketing & Inspection (DMI), Ministry of
rnment of India
focus groups
Rational for selection
Study area in Pujab, India—same agroclimatic zone as
study site (semi-arid)
Study area Haryana, India—same agroclimatic zone as
study site (semi- arid). Study Variety HD 2329 grown
in Jaipur
Study area in Pujab, India—same agroclimatic zone as
study site
Study area in Pujab, India—same agroclimatic zone as
study site
Crop coefﬁcients in growth periods (Kc)
ason Total Initial Development Mid-season Late season
120 0.34 0.69 1.05 0.65
130 0.5 1.36 1.24 0.42
150 0.34 0.61 0.88 0.82
150 0.26 0.63 1 0.63
C. Bowe, D.v. der Horst / Ecosystem Services 15 (2015) 1–1010and progressively minded agricultural extension service could be
vital in creating a shared value approach, providing an important
step in shifting the company towards a more pro-active, con-
structive and collaborative role in engaging with water scarcity,
ecosystem degradation and other important environmental chal-
lenges of the 21st century.Acknowledgements
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